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HICK'S RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AND 
"REFORMED EPISTEMOLOGY": 
A MIDDLE GROUND 
David Basinger 
The purpose of this discussion is to analyze comparatively the influential argument for 
religious pluralism offered by John Hick and the argument for religious exclusivism 
(sectarianism) which can be generated by proponents of what has come to be labeled 
'Reformed Epistemology.' I argue that while Hick and the Reformed exclusivist appear to 
be giving us incompatible responses to the same question about the true nature of 'religious' 
reality, they are actually responding to related, but distinct questions, each of which must 
be considered by those desiring to give a religious explanation for the phenomenon of 
religious diversity. Moreover, I conclude that the insights of neither ought to be emphasized 
at the expense of the other. 
No one denies that the basic tenets of many religious perspectives are, if taken 
literally, quite incompatible. The salvific claims of some forms of Judeo-Christian 
thought, for example, condemn the proponents of all other perspectives to hell, 
while the incompatible salvific claims of some forms ofIslamic thought do the same. 
Such incompatibility is normally explained in one of three basic ways. The non-
theist argues that all religious claims are false, the product perhaps of wish fulfill-
ment. The religious pluralist argues that the basic claims of at least all ofthe major 
world religions are more or less accurate descriptions of the same reality. Finally, 
the religious exclusivist argues that the tenets of only one religion (or some limited 
number of religions) are to any significant degree accurate descriptions of reality. I 
The purpose of this discussion is to analyze comparatively the influential argu-
ment for religious pluralism offered by John Hick and the argument for religious 
exclusivism which can be (and perhaps has been) generated by proponents of what 
has come to be labeled 'Reformed Epistemology.' I shall argue that while Hick 
and the Reformed epistemologist appear to be giving us incompatible responses 
to the same question about the true nature of 'religious' reality, they are actually 
responding to related, but distinct questions, each of which must be considered by 
those desiring to give a religious explanation for the phenomenon of religious di-
versity. Moreover, I shall conclude that the insights offered by both Hick and the 
Reformed epistemologist are of value and, accordingly, that those of neither ought 
to be emphasized at the expense of the other. 
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John Hick's Theological Pluralism 
Hick's contention is not that different religions make no conflicting truth 
claims. In fact, he believes that "the differences of belief between (and within) 
the traditions are legion," and has often in great detail discussed them. 2 His basic 
claim, rather, is that such differences are best seen as "different ways of con-
ceiving and experiencing the one ultimate divine Reality. "3 
However, if the various religions are really "responses to a single ultimate 
transcendent Reality," how then do we account for such significant differences?4 
The best explanation, we are told, is the assumption that "the limitless divine 
reality has been thought and experienced by different human mentalities forming 
and formed by different intellectual frameworks and devotional techniques."5 
Or, as Hick has stated the point elsewhere, the best explanation is the assumption 
that the correspondingly different ways of responding to divine reality "owe their 
differences to the modes of thinking, perceiving and feeling which have developed 
within the different patterns of human existence embodied in the various cultures 
of the earth." Each "constitutes a valid context of salvation/liberation; but none 
constitutes the one and only such context."6 
But why accept such a pluralistic explanation? Why not hold, rather, that there 
is no higher Reality beyond us and thus that all religious claims are false-i.e., 
why not opt for naturalism? Or why not adopt the exclusivistic contention that 
the religious claims of only one perspective are true? 
Hick does not reject naturalism because he sees it to be an untenable position. 
It is certainly possible, he tells us, that the "entire realm of [religious] experience 
is delusory or hallucinatory, simply a human projection, and not in any way or 
degree a result of the presence of a greater divine reality."7 In fact, since the 
"universe of which we are part is religiously ambiguous," it is not even unreason-
able or implausible "to interpret any aspect of it, including our religious experi-
ence, in non-religious as well as religious ways."8 
However, he is quick to add, "it is perfectly reasonable and sane for us to 
trust our experience"-including our religious experience-"as generally cogni-
tive of reality except when we have some reason to doubt it."9 Moreover, "the 
mere theoretical possibility that any or all [religious experience] may be illusory 
does not count as a reason to doubt it." Nor is religious experience overturned 
by the fact that the great religious figures of the past, including Jesus, held a 
number of beliefs which we today reject as arising from the now outmoded 
science of their day, or by the fact that some people find "it impossible to accept 
that the profound dimension of pain and suffering is the measure of the cost of 
creation through creaturely freedom."10 
He acknowledges that those who have "no positive ground for religious belief 
within their own experience" often do see such factors as "insuperable barriers" 
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to religious belief. II But given the ambiguous nature of the evidence, he argues, it 
cannot be demonstrated that all rational people must see it this way. That is, belief 
in a supernatural realm can't be shown to be any less plausible than disbelief. 
Accordingly, he concludes, "those who actually participate in this field of religious 
experience are fully entitled, as sane and rational persons, to take the risk of trusting 
their own experience together with that of their tradition, and of proceeding to live 
and to believe on the basis of it, rather than taking the alternative risk of distrusting 
it and so-for the time being at least-turning their backs on God."12 
But why choose pluralism as the best religious hypothesis? Why does Hick 
believe we ought not be excIusivists? It is not because he sees exclusivism as 
incoherent. It is certainly possible, he grants, that "one particular 'Ptolomaic' 
religious vision does correspond uniquely with how things are."13 Nor does Hick 
claim to have some privileged "cosmic vantage point from which [he can] observe 
both the divine reality in itself and the different partial human awarenesses of 
that reality."14 But when we individually consider the evidence in the case, he 
argues, the result is less ambiguous. When "we start from the phenomenological 
fact of the various forms of religious experience, and we seek an hypothesis 
which will make sense of this realm of phenomena" from a religious point of 
view, "the theory that most naturally suggests itself postulates a divine Reality 
which is itself limitless, exceeding the scope of human conceptuality and lan-
guage, but which is humanly thought and experienced in various conditioned 
and limited ways."" 
What is this evidence which makes the pluralistic hypothesis so "considerably 
more probable" than exclusivism? For one thing, Hick informs us, a credible 
religious hypothesis must account for the fact, "evident to ordinary people (even 
though not always taken into account by theologians) that in the great majority 
of cases-say 98 to 99 percent-the religion in which a person believes and to 
which he adheres depends upon where he was born."16 Moreover, a credible 
hypothesis must account for the fact that within all of the major religious tradi-
tions, "basically the same salvific process is taking place, namely the transforma-
tion of human existence from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness. "17 And 
while pluralism "illuminates" these otherwise baffling facts, the strict excIusivist' s 
view "has come to seem increasingly implausible and unrealistic. "18 
But even more importantly, he maintains, a credible religious hypothesis must 
account for the fact, of which "we have become irreversibly aware in the present 
century, as the result of anthropological, sociological and psychological studies 
and the work philosophy of language, that there is no one universal and invariable" 
pattern for interpreting human experience, but rather a range of significantly 
different patterns or conceptual schemes "which have developed within the major 
cultural streams." And when considered in light of this, Hick concludes, a 
"pluralistic theory becomes inevitable." 19 
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The Reformed Objection 
There are two basic ways in which Hick's pluralistic position can be critiqued. 
One "appropriate critical response," according to Hick himself, "would be to 
offer a better [religious] hypothesis."20 That is, one way to challenge Hick is to 
claim that the evidence he cites is better explained by some form of exclusivism. 
But there is another, potentially more powerful type of objection, one which 
finds its roots in the currently popular 'Reformed Epistemology' being cham-
pioned by philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga. I will first briefly outline Plan-
tinga's latest version of this epistemological approach and then discuss its impact 
on Hick's position. 
According to Plantinga, it has been widely held since the Enlightenment that 
if theistic beliefs~.g., religious hypotheses-are to be considered rational, they 
must be based on propositional evidence. It is not enough for the theist just to 
refute objections to any such belief. The theist "must also have something like 
an argument for the belief, or some positive reason to think that the belief is 
true. "21 But this is incorrect, Plantinga maintains. There are beliefs which acquire 
their warrant propositionally-i.e., have warrant conferred on them by an eviden-
tial line of reasoning from other beliefs. And for such beliefs, it may well be 
true that proponents need something like an argument for their veridicality. 
However, there are also, he tells us, basic beliefs which are not based on 
propositional evidence and, thus, do not require propositional warrant. In fact, 
if such beliefs can be affirmed "without either violating an epistemic duty or 
displaying some kind of noetic defect," they can be considered properly basic. 22 
And, according to Plantinga, many theistic beliefs can be properly basic: "Under 
widely realized conditions it is perfectly rational, reasonable, intellectually 
respectable and acceptable to believe [certain theistic tenets] without believing 
[them] on the basis of [propositional] evidence."23 
But what are such conditions? Under what conditions can a belief have positive 
epistemic status if it is not conferred by other propositions whose epistemic status 
is not in question? The answer, Plantinga informs us, lies in an analysis of belief 
formation. 
[We have] cognitive faculties designed to enable us to achieve true 
beliefs with respect to a wide variety of propositions-propositions 
about our immediate environment, about our interior lives, about the 
thoughts and experiences of other persons, about our universe at large, 
about right and wrong, about the whole realm of abstracta-numbers, 
properties, propositions, states of affairs, possible worlds and their like, 
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about modality-what is necessary and possible-and about [ourselves]. 
These faculties work in such a way that under the appropriate cir-
cumstances we form the appropriate belief. More exactly, the appropriate 
belief is formed in us; in the typical case we do not decide to hold or 
form the belief in question, but simply find ourselves with it. Upon 
considering an instance of modus ponens, I find myself believing its 
corresponding conditional; upon being appeared to in the familiar way, 
I find myself holding the belief that there is a large tree before me; 
upon being asked what I had for breakfast, I reflect for a moment and 
find myself with the belief that what I had was eggs on toast. In these 
and other cases I do not decide what to believe; I don't total up the 
evidence (I'm being appeared to redly; on most occasions when thus 
appeared to I am in the presence of something red, so most probably 
in this case I am) and make a decision as to what seems best supported; 
I simply find myself believing. 24 
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And from a theistic point of view, Plantinga continues, the same is true in 
the religious realm. Just as it is true that when our senses or memory is functioning 
properly, "appropriate belief is formed in us," so it is that God has created us 
with faculties which will, "when they are working the way they were designed 
to work by the being who designed and created us and them," produce true 
theistic beliefs. 25 Moreover, if these faculties are functioning properly, a basic 
belief thus formed has "positive epistemic status to the degree [the individual in 
question finds herself] inclined to accept it. "26 
What, though, of the alleged counter-evidence to such theistic beliefs? What, 
for example, of all the arguments the conclusion of which is that God does not 
exist? Can they all be dismissed as irrelevant? Not immediately, answers Plan-
tinga. We must seriously consider potential defeaters of our basic beliefs. With 
respect to the belief that God exists, for example, we must seriously consider 
the claim that religious belief is mere wish fulfillment and the claim that God's 
existence is incompatible with (or at least improbable given) the amount of evil 
in the world. 
But to undercut such defeaters, he continues, we need not engage in positive 
apologetics: produce propositional evidence for our beliefs. We need only engage 
in negative apologetics: refute such arguments. 27 Moreover, it is Plantinga's 
conviction that such defeaters do normally exist. "The nonpropositional warrant 
enjoyed by [a person's] belief in God, for example, [seems] itself sufficient to 
tum back the challenge offered by some alleged defeaters"-e.g., the claim that 
theistic belief is mere wish fulfillment. And other defeaters such as the "problem 
of evil" he tells us, can be undercut by identifying validity or soundness problems 
or even by appealing to the fact that "experts think it unsound or that the experts 
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are evenly divided as to its soundness. "28 
Thus, not surprisingly, he concludes that, even considering all the alleged 
counter-evidence, there is little reason to believe that many theistic beliefs cannot 
be considered properly basic for most adult theists--even intellectually sophisti-
cated adult theists. 
Do Plantinga or other proponents of this Reformed epistemology maintain that 
their exclusivistic religious hypotheses are properly basic and can thus be 'de-
fended' in the manner just outlined? I am not certain that they do. However, 
when Plantinga, for example, claims that "God exists" is for most adult theists 
properly basic, he appears to have in mind a classical Christian conception of 
the divine-i.e., a being who is the triune, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly 
good, ex nihilo creator of the universe. In fact, given his recent claim that "the 
internal testimony of the Holy Spirit ... is a source of reliable and perfectly 
acceptable beliefs about what is communicated [by God] in Scripture," and the 
manner in which most who make such a claim view the truth claims of the other 
world religions, it would appear that Plantinga's 'basic' conception of God is 
quite exclusive. 29 
However, even if no Reformed epistemologist actually does affirm an 
exclusivistic hypothesis she claims is properly basic, it is obvious that the 
Reformed analysis of belief justification can be used to critique Hick's line of 
reasoning. Hick claims that an objective inductive assessment of the relevant 
evidence makes his pluralistic thesis a more plausible religious explanation than 
any of the competing exclusivistic hypotheses. But a Reformed exclusivist could 
easily argue that this approach to the issue is misguided. My affirmation of an 
exclusivistic Christian perspective, such an argument might begin, is not eviden-
tial in nature. It is, rather, simply a belief I have found formed in me, much 
like the belief that I am seeing a tree in front of me or the belief that killing 
innocent children is wrong. 
Now, of course, I must seriously consider the allegedly formidable defeaters 
with which pluralists such as Hick have presented me. I must consider the fact, 
for example, that the exclusive beliefs simply formed in most people are not 
similar to mine, but rather tend to mirror those beliefs found in the cultures in 
which such people have been raised. But I do not agree with Hick that this fact 
is best explained by a pluralistic hypothesis. I attribute this phenomenon to other 
factors such as the epistemic blindness with which much of humanity has been 
plagued since the fall. 30 
Moreover, to defend my position-to maintain justifiably (rationally) that I 
am right and Hick is wrong-I need not, as Hick seems to suggest, produce 
objective 'proof' that his hypothesis is weaker than mine. That is, I need not 
produce 'evidence' that would lead most rational people to agree with me. That 
would be to involve myself in Classical Foundationalism, which is increasingly 
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being recognized as a bankrupt epistemological methodology. All I need do is 
undercut Hick's defeaters-i.e., show that his challenge does not require me to 
abandon my exclusivity thesis. And this I can easily do. For Hick has not 
demonstrated that my thesis is self-contradictory. And it is extremely doubtful 
that there exists any other nonquestion-begging criterion for plausibility by which 
he could even attempt to demonstrate that my thesis is less plausible (less probable) 
than his. 
Hick, of course, believes firmly that his hypothesis makes the most sense. 
But why should this bother me? By his own admission, many individuals firmly 
believe that, given the amount of seemingly gratuitous evil in the world, God's 
nonexistence is by far most plausible. Yet this does not keep him from affirming 
theism. He simply reserves the right to see things differently and continues to 
believe. And there is no reason why I cannot do the same. 
Moreover, even if what others believed were relevant, by Hick's own admis-
sion, the majority of theists doubt that his thesis is true. 31 Or, at the very least, 
I could rightly maintain that "the experts are evenly divided as to its soundness." 
Thus, given the criteria for defeater assessment which we Reformed exclusivists 
affirm, Hick's defeaters are clearly undercut. And, accordingly, I remain perfectly 
justified in continuing to hold that my exclusivity thesis is correct and, therefore, 
that all incompatible competing hypotheses are false. 
A Middle Ground 
It is tempting to see Hick and the Reformed exclusivist as espousing incompat-
ible approaches to the question of religious diversity. If Hick is correct-if the 
issue is primarily evidential in nature-then the Reformed exclusivist is misguided 
and vice versa. But this, I believe, is an inaccurate assessment of the situation. 
There are two equally important, but distinct, questions which arise in this 
context, and Hick and the Reformed exclusivist, it seems to me, each primarily 
address only one. 
The Reformed exclusivist is primarily interested in the following question: 
Ql: Under what conditions is an individual within her epistemic rights 
(is she rational) in affirming one of the many mutually exclusive 
religious diversity hypotheses? 
In response, as we have seen, the Reformed exclusivist argues (or at least 
could argue) that a person need not grant that her religious hypothesis (belief) 
requires propositional (evidential) warrant. She is within her epistemic rights in 
maintaining that it is a basic belief. And if she does so, then to preserve rationality, 
she is not required to 'prove' in some objective manner that her hypothesis is 
most plausible. She is fulfilling all epistemic requirements solely by defending 
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her hypothesis against claims that it is less plausible than competitors. 
It seems to me that the Reformed exclusivist is basically right on this point. 
I do believe, for reasons mentioned later in this essay, that attempts by any 
knowledgeable exclusivist to defend her hypothesis will ultimately require her 
to enter the realm of positive apologetics-i.e., will require her to engage in a 
comparative analysis of her exclusivistic beliefs. But I wholeheartedly agree 
with the Reformed exclusivist's contention that to preserve rationality, she need 
not actually demonstrate that her hypothesis is most plausible. She need ultimately 
only defend herself against the claim that a thoughtful assessment of the matter 
makes the affirmation of some incompatible perspective-i.e., pluralism or some 
incompatible exclusivistic perspective-the only rational option. And this, I 
believe, she can clearly do. 
What this means, of course, is that if Hick is actually arguing that pluralism 
is the only rational option, then I think he is wrong. And his claim that pluralism 
"is considerably more probable" than exclusivism does, it must be granted, make 
it appear as if he believes pluralism to be the only hypothesis a knowledgeable 
theist can justifiably affirm. 
But Hick never actually calls his opponents irrational in this context. That is, 
while Hick clearly believes that sincere, knowledgeable exclusivists are wrong, 
he has never to my knowledge claimed that they are guilty of violating the basic 
epistemic rules governing rational belief. Accordingly, it seems best to assume 
that QI-a concern with what can be rationally affirmed-is not Hick's primary 
interest in this context. 
But what then is it with which Hick is concerned? As we have seen, QI is 
defensive in nature. It asks for identification of conditions under which we can 
justifiably continue to affirm a belief we already hold. But why hold the specific 
religious beliefs we desire to defend? Why, specifically, choose to defend 
religious pluralism rather than exclusivism or vice versa? Or, to state this question 
of 'belief origin' more formally: 
Q2: Given that an individual can be within her epistemic rights (can be 
rational) in affirming either exclusivism or pluralism, upon what 
basis should her actual choice be made? 
This is the type of question in which I believe Hick is primarily interested. 
Now, it might be tempting for a Reformed exclusivist to contend that she is 
exempt from the consideration of Q2. As I see it, she might begin, this question 
is based on the assumption that individuals consciously choose their religious 
belief systems. But the exclusivistic hypothesis which I affirm was not the result 
of a conscious attempt to choose the most plausible option. I have simply dis-
covered this exclusivistic hypothesis formed in me in much the same fashion I 
find my visual and moral beliefs just formed in me. And thus Hick's question 
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is simply irrelevant to my position. 
But such a response will not do. There is no reason to deny that Reformed 
exclusivists do have, let's say, a Calvinistic religious hypothesis just formed in 
them. However, although almost everyone in every culture does in the appropriate 
context have similar 'tree-beliefs' just formed in them, there is no such unanimity 
within the religious realm. As Hick rightly points out, the religious belief that 
the overwhelming majority of people in any given culture find just formed in 
them is the dominant hypothesis of that culture or subculture. Moreover, the 
dominant religious hypotheses in most of these cultures are exclusivistic-i.e., 
incompatible with one another. 
Accordingly, it seems to me that Hick can rightly be interpreted as offering 
the following challenge to the knowledgeable Reformed exclusivist (the 
exclusivist aware of pervasive religious diversity): I will grant that your 
exclusivistic beliefs were not originally the product of conscious deliberation. 
But given that most sincere theists initially go through a type of religious belief-
forming process similar to yours and yet usually find formed in themselves the 
dominant exclusivistic hypotheses of their own culture, upon what basis can you 
justifiably continue to claim that the hypothesis you affirm has some special 
status just because you found it formed in you? Or, to state the question somewhat 
differently, Hick's analysis of religious diversity challenges knowledgeable 
Reformed exclusivists to ask themselves why they now believe that their religious 
belief-forming mechanisms are functioning properly while the analogous 
mechanisms in all others are faulty. 
Some Reformed exclusivists, as we have seen, have a ready response. Because 
of 'the fall,' they maintain, most individuals suffer from religious epistemic 
blindness-i.e., do not possess properly functioning religious belief-forming 
mechanisms. Only our mechanisms are trustworthy. However, every exclusivistic 
religious tradition can-and many do-make such claims. Hence, an analogous 
Hickian question again faces knowledgeable Reformed exclusivists: Why do you 
believe that only those religious belief-forming mechanisms which produce ex-
c1usivistic beliefs compatible with yours do not suffer from epistemic blindness? 
Reformed exclusivists cannot at this point argue that they have found this 
belief just formed in them for it is now the reliability of the belief-forming 
mechanism, itself, which is being questioned. Nor, since they are anti-foun-
dationalists, can Reformed exclusivists argue that the evidence demonstrates 
conclusively that their position is correct. So upon what then can they base their 
crucial belief that their religious belief-forming mechanisms alone produce true 
beliefs? 
They must, it seems to me, ultimately fall back on the contention that their 
belief-forming mechanisms can alone be trusted because that set of beliefs thus 
generated appears to them to form the most plausible religious explanatory 
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hypothesis available. But to respond in this fashion brings them into basic 
methodological agreement with Hick's position on Q2. That is, it appears that 
knowledgeable Reformed exclusivists must ultimately maintain with Hick that 
when attempting to discover which of the many self-consistent hypotheses that 
can rationally be affirmed is the one that ought to be affirmed, a person must 
finally decide which hypothesis she believes best explains the phenomena. Or, 
to state this important point differently yet, what Hick's analysis of religious 
diversity demonstrates, I believe, is that even for those knowledgeable Reformed 
exclusivists who claim to find their religious perspectives just formed in them, 
a conscious choice among competing religious hypotheses is ultimately called for. 
This is not to say, it must again be emphasized, that such Reformed exclusivists 
must attempt to 'prove' their choice is best. But, given the culturally relative 
nature of religious belief-forming mechanisms, a simple appeal to such a 
mechanism seems inadequate as a basis for such exclusivists to continue to affirm 
their perspective. It seems rather that knowledgeable exclusivists must ultimately 
make a conscious decision whether to retain the religious hypothesis that has 
been formed in them or choose another. And it further appears that they should 
feel some prima facie obligation to consider the available options--consciously 
consider the nature of the various religious hypotheses formed in people-before 
doing so. 
Now, of course, to agree that such a comparative analysis should be undertaken 
is not to say that Hick's pluralistic hypothesis is, in fact, the most plausible 
alternative. I agree with the Reformed exclusivist that 'plausibility' is a very 
subjective concept. Thus, I doubt that the serious consideration of the competing 
explanatory hypotheses for religious phenomena, even by knowledgeable, open-
minded individuals, will produce consensus. 
However, I do not see this as in any sense diminishing the importance of 
engaging in the type of comparative analysis suggested. For even if such com-
parative assessment will not lead to consensus, it will produce two significant 
benefits. First, only by such assessment, I feel, can a person acquire 'ownership' 
of her religious hypothesis. That is, only by such an assessment can she insure 
herself that her belief is not solely the product of environmental conditioning. 
Second, such an assessment should lead all concerned to be more tolerant of 
those with which they ultimately disagree. And in an age where radical religious 
exclusivism again threatens world peace, I believe such tolerance to be of ines-
timable value. 
This does not mean, let me again emphasize in closing, that the consideration 
of Q I-the consideration of the conditions under which a religious hypothesis 
can be rationally affirmed-is unimportant or even less important than the con-
sideration of Q2. It is crucial that we recognize who must actually shoulder the 
'burden of proof' in this context. And we need to thank Reformed exclusivists 
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for helping us think more clearly about this matter. But I fear that a preoccupation 
with Q 1 can keep us from seeing the importance of Q2-the consideration of 
the basis upon which we choose the hypothesis to be defended-and the compara-
tive assessment of hypotheses to which such consideration leads us. And we 
need to thank pluralists such as Hick for drawing our attention to this fact. 
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